David Newman
Specialist in Health Care Financing
The total U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population in 2010 was estimated to be slightly more than 304 million. Roughly 84.5% of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population had one or more forms of health insurance, while 15.5%, or roughly 47.2 million, were uninsured. The most common form of insurance was employer provided.
This report employs the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) to describe health insurance coverage and provide estimates of coverage by type of coverage at the national, state, and congressional district level. The ACS survey has a sample of more than 2 million respondents and solicits health insurance coverage information as of the date of the survey. The sample is large enough to provide accurate estimates of coverage at the congressional district level at a point in time. As this report details, there are considerable differences across states, within states, and across demographic groups in the proportion of insured and their sources of coverage.
The insured were more likely to be white or Asian, more educated, higher income, elderly, and female. The uninsured were more likely to be African American or Hispanic, less educated, lower income, non-elderly adult, and male. In general, the uninsured are more likely to report problems getting needed medical care and to be hospitalized for avoidable health problems.
Date of Report: October 20, 2011
Number of Pages: 82
Order Number: R42055
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Categorical Eligibility
Gene Falk
Specialist in Social Policy
Randy Alison Aussenberg
Analyst in Social Policy
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides benefits to low-income, eligible households on an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card; benefits can then be exchanged for foods at authorized retailers. SNAP reaches a large share of low-income households. In April 2011, there were 45 million persons in 21 million households benefitting from SNAP.
Federal SNAP law provides two basic pathways for financial eligibility to the program: (1) meeting federal eligibility requirements, or (2) being automatically or “categorically” eligible for SNAP based on being eligible for or receiving benefits from other specified low-income assistance programs. Categorical eligibility eliminated the requirement that households who already met financial eligibility rules in one specified low-income program go through another financial eligibility determination in SNAP.
In its traditional form, categorical eligibility conveys SNAP eligibility through the receipt of cash assistance from Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, or state-run General Assistance (GA) programs. However, since the 1996 welfare reform law, states have been able to expand categorical eligibility beyond its traditional bounds. That law created TANF to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was a traditional cash assistance program. TANF is a broadpurpose block grant that finances a wide range of social and human services. TANF gives states flexibility in meeting its goals, resulting in a wide variation of benefits and services offered among the states. SNAP allows states to convey categorical eligibility based on receipt of a TANF “benefit,” not just TANF cash welfare. This provides states with the ability to convey categorical eligibility based on a wide range of benefits and services. TANF benefits other than cash assistance typically are available to a broader range of households and at higher levels of income than are TANF cash assistance benefits.
In total, 43 jurisdictions have implemented what the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has called “broad-based” categorical eligibility. These jurisdictions generally make all households with incomes below a state-determined income threshold eligible for SNAP. States do this by providing households with a low-cost TANF-funded benefit or service such as a brochure or referral to an “800” number telephone hotline. There are varying income eligibility thresholds within states that convey “broad-based” categorical eligibility, though no state has a gross income limit above 200% of the federal poverty guidelines. In all but three of these jurisdictions, there is no asset test required for SNAP eligibility. Categorically eligible families bypass the regular SNAP asset limits. However, their net incomes (income after deductions for expenses) must still be low enough to qualify for a SNAP benefit. That is, it is possible to be categorically eligible for SNAP but have net income too high to actually receive a benefit. The exception to this is one- or two-person households that would still receive the minimum benefit.
During the decade of the 2000s, there were a number of proposals to restrict categorical eligibility based on receipt of TANF benefits. These proposals would have limited TANF-based categorical assistance to households receiving TANF-funded cash assistance. The proposal was made by the Bush Administration in its farm bill proposals and several budget submissions. It passed the House in a budget reconciliation bill in 2005 (H.R. 4241, 109th Congress) but was not part of that year’s final reconciliation package, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171).
Date of Report: October 21, 2011
Number of Pages: 18
Order Number: R42054
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Specialist in Social Policy
Randy Alison Aussenberg
Analyst in Social Policy
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides benefits to low-income, eligible households on an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card; benefits can then be exchanged for foods at authorized retailers. SNAP reaches a large share of low-income households. In April 2011, there were 45 million persons in 21 million households benefitting from SNAP.
Federal SNAP law provides two basic pathways for financial eligibility to the program: (1) meeting federal eligibility requirements, or (2) being automatically or “categorically” eligible for SNAP based on being eligible for or receiving benefits from other specified low-income assistance programs. Categorical eligibility eliminated the requirement that households who already met financial eligibility rules in one specified low-income program go through another financial eligibility determination in SNAP.
In its traditional form, categorical eligibility conveys SNAP eligibility through the receipt of cash assistance from Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, or state-run General Assistance (GA) programs. However, since the 1996 welfare reform law, states have been able to expand categorical eligibility beyond its traditional bounds. That law created TANF to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was a traditional cash assistance program. TANF is a broadpurpose block grant that finances a wide range of social and human services. TANF gives states flexibility in meeting its goals, resulting in a wide variation of benefits and services offered among the states. SNAP allows states to convey categorical eligibility based on receipt of a TANF “benefit,” not just TANF cash welfare. This provides states with the ability to convey categorical eligibility based on a wide range of benefits and services. TANF benefits other than cash assistance typically are available to a broader range of households and at higher levels of income than are TANF cash assistance benefits.
In total, 43 jurisdictions have implemented what the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has called “broad-based” categorical eligibility. These jurisdictions generally make all households with incomes below a state-determined income threshold eligible for SNAP. States do this by providing households with a low-cost TANF-funded benefit or service such as a brochure or referral to an “800” number telephone hotline. There are varying income eligibility thresholds within states that convey “broad-based” categorical eligibility, though no state has a gross income limit above 200% of the federal poverty guidelines. In all but three of these jurisdictions, there is no asset test required for SNAP eligibility. Categorically eligible families bypass the regular SNAP asset limits. However, their net incomes (income after deductions for expenses) must still be low enough to qualify for a SNAP benefit. That is, it is possible to be categorically eligible for SNAP but have net income too high to actually receive a benefit. The exception to this is one- or two-person households that would still receive the minimum benefit.
During the decade of the 2000s, there were a number of proposals to restrict categorical eligibility based on receipt of TANF benefits. These proposals would have limited TANF-based categorical assistance to households receiving TANF-funded cash assistance. The proposal was made by the Bush Administration in its farm bill proposals and several budget submissions. It passed the House in a budget reconciliation bill in 2005 (H.R. 4241, 109th Congress) but was not part of that year’s final reconciliation package, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171).
Date of Report: October 21, 2011
Number of Pages: 18
Order Number: R42054
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Wednesday, October 19, 2011
Definition of Income in PPACA for Certain Medicaid Provisions and Premium Credits
Janemarie Mulvey, Coordinator
Specialist in Health Care Financing
Evelyne P. Baumrucker
Analyst in Health Care Financing
Bernadette Fernandez
Specialist in Health Care Financing
Christine Scott
Specialist in Social Policy
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), the definition of income for eligibility for certain Medicaid populations and premium credits in the exchanges is based on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI). The initial intent of using MAGI was to standardize the definition of income for Medicaid eligibility purposes to reduce some of the variability and complexity that exists under the current program and to provide consistency between Medicaid and the health insurance exchange. The use of MAGI, however, has raised some concerns among Congress and the Obama Administration, as it excludes some types of income either partially or altogether. Of particular interest has been the potential impact of eligibility for Medicaid and premium credits for early retirees (aged 62 through 64) receiving Social Security benefits, as some or all of their Social Security income may be excluded from the MAGI definition of income. By excluding some types of income, individuals and families with a higher percentage of total income relative to the federal poverty level may qualify for Medicaid and premium credits. A recent cost estimate by the Congressional Budget Office finds that changing the MAGI income calculation to include all Social Security benefits would reduce the deficit by $13 billion over the 2012-2021 period.
Legislative proposals have been introduced in both chambers of Congress to change the definition of income to be more inclusive and consistent with other low-income programs. President Obama also included changing the definition of income for these programs in his deficit reduction proposal. In evaluating these proposals, a number of issues might be considered. First, an alternative definition may add complexity compared with the use of MAGI. Specifically, because adjusted gross income (on which MAGI is based) can be computed largely from information on an individual’s federal tax return, verification of income is streamlined. If an alternative definition is used that is not based on tax return information, the administrative complexity of verifying nontaxable income from different sources comes into play. Second, the definition was developed to ensure coordination between Medicaid and premium credits in the health insurance exchange. A change in the definition of income for Medicaid should then also apply to premium credits to ensure consistency between Medicaid and the premium credit offered to selected individuals who purchase private health insurance through the exchanges. Finally, many of the current legislative proposals have focused largely on the inclusion of Social Security benefits in income definitions for eligibility purposes. However, most other low-income programs include other types of income (e.g., nontaxable pensions) and asset holdings that are also excluded from MAGI.
Date of Report: October 5, 2011
Number of Pages: 24
Order Number: R41997
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Monday, October 17, 2011
Abortion: Judicial History and Legislative Response
Jon O. Shimabukuro
Legislative Attorney
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Roe v. Wade that the U.S. Constitution protects a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. In Doe v. Bolton, a companion decision, the Court found that a state may not unduly burden the exercise of that fundamental right with regulations that prohibit or substantially limit access to the means of effectuating the decision to have an abortion. Rather than settle the issue, the Court’s rulings since Roe and Doe have continued to generate debate and have precipitated a variety of governmental actions at the national, state, and local levels designed either to nullify the rulings or limit their effect. These governmental regulations have, in turn, spawned further litigation in which resulting judicial refinements in the law have been no more successful in dampening the controversy.
In recent years, the rights enumerated in Roe have been redefined by decisions such as Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, which gave greater leeway to the States to restrict abortion, and Rust v. Sullivan, which narrowed the scope of permissible abortion-related activities that are linked to federal funding. The Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which established the “undue burden” standard for determining whether abortion restrictions are permissible, gave Congress additional impetus to move on statutory responses to the abortion issue, such as the Freedom of Choice Act.
Legislation to prohibit a specific abortion procedure, the so-called “partial-birth” abortion procedure, was passed in the 108th Congress. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act appears to be one of the only examples of Congress restricting the performance of a medical procedure. Legislation that would prohibit the knowing transport of a minor across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion has been introduced in numerous Congresses.
Since Roe, Congress has attached abortion funding restrictions to various appropriations measures. The greatest focus has arguably been on restricting Medicaid abortions under the annual appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services. This restriction is commonly referred to as the “Hyde Amendment” because of its original sponsor. Similar restrictions affect the appropriations for other federal entities, including the Department of Justice, where federal funds may not be used to perform abortions in the federal prison system, except in cases of rape or if the life of the mother would be endangered. Hyde-type amendments also have an impact in the District of Columbia, where federal funds may not be used to perform abortions except in cases of rape, incest or where the life of the mother would be endangered, and affect international organizations like the United Nations Population Fund, which receives funds through the annual Foreign Operations appropriations measure.
Finally, the debate over abortion continued in the context of health reform. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), enacted on March 23, 2010, includes provisions that address the coverage of abortion services by qualified health plans that will be available through health benefit exchanges beginning in 2014. PPACA’s abortion provisions have been controversial, particularly with regard to the use of premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies to obtain health coverage that includes coverage for elective or non-therapeutic abortion services. Under PPACA, individuals who receive a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy will be permitted to select a qualified health plan that includes coverage for elective abortions, subject to funding segregation requirements that will be imposed on both the plan issuer and the enrollees in such a plan.
Date of Report: October 7, 2011
Number of Pages: 20
Order Number: RL33467
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Legislative Attorney
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Roe v. Wade that the U.S. Constitution protects a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. In Doe v. Bolton, a companion decision, the Court found that a state may not unduly burden the exercise of that fundamental right with regulations that prohibit or substantially limit access to the means of effectuating the decision to have an abortion. Rather than settle the issue, the Court’s rulings since Roe and Doe have continued to generate debate and have precipitated a variety of governmental actions at the national, state, and local levels designed either to nullify the rulings or limit their effect. These governmental regulations have, in turn, spawned further litigation in which resulting judicial refinements in the law have been no more successful in dampening the controversy.
In recent years, the rights enumerated in Roe have been redefined by decisions such as Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, which gave greater leeway to the States to restrict abortion, and Rust v. Sullivan, which narrowed the scope of permissible abortion-related activities that are linked to federal funding. The Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which established the “undue burden” standard for determining whether abortion restrictions are permissible, gave Congress additional impetus to move on statutory responses to the abortion issue, such as the Freedom of Choice Act.
Legislation to prohibit a specific abortion procedure, the so-called “partial-birth” abortion procedure, was passed in the 108th Congress. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act appears to be one of the only examples of Congress restricting the performance of a medical procedure. Legislation that would prohibit the knowing transport of a minor across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion has been introduced in numerous Congresses.
Since Roe, Congress has attached abortion funding restrictions to various appropriations measures. The greatest focus has arguably been on restricting Medicaid abortions under the annual appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services. This restriction is commonly referred to as the “Hyde Amendment” because of its original sponsor. Similar restrictions affect the appropriations for other federal entities, including the Department of Justice, where federal funds may not be used to perform abortions in the federal prison system, except in cases of rape or if the life of the mother would be endangered. Hyde-type amendments also have an impact in the District of Columbia, where federal funds may not be used to perform abortions except in cases of rape, incest or where the life of the mother would be endangered, and affect international organizations like the United Nations Population Fund, which receives funds through the annual Foreign Operations appropriations measure.
Finally, the debate over abortion continued in the context of health reform. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), enacted on March 23, 2010, includes provisions that address the coverage of abortion services by qualified health plans that will be available through health benefit exchanges beginning in 2014. PPACA’s abortion provisions have been controversial, particularly with regard to the use of premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies to obtain health coverage that includes coverage for elective or non-therapeutic abortion services. Under PPACA, individuals who receive a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy will be permitted to select a qualified health plan that includes coverage for elective abortions, subject to funding segregation requirements that will be imposed on both the plan issuer and the enrollees in such a plan.
Date of Report: October 7, 2011
Number of Pages: 20
Order Number: RL33467
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Health Care: Constitutional Rights and Legislative Powers
Kathleen S. Swendiman
Legislative Attorney
The health care reform debate raises many complex issues including those of coverage, accessibility, cost, accountability, and quality of health care. Underlying these policy considerations are issues regarding the status of health care as a constitutional or legal right. This report analyzes constitutional and legal issues pertaining to a right to health care, as well as the power of Congress to enact and fund health care programs. Following the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148, legal issues have been raised regarding the power of Congress to mandate that individuals purchase health insurance, and the ability of states to “nullify” or “opt out” of such a requirement. These issues are also discussed.
The U.S. Constitution does not set forth an explicit right to health care. While the Supreme Court would likely find that the Constitution provides a right to obtain health care services at one’s own expense from willing providers, the Supreme Court has never interpreted the Constitution as guaranteeing a right to health care services from the government for those who cannot afford it. The Supreme Court has, however, held that the government has an obligation to provide medical care in certain limited circumstances, such as for prisoners.
While the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations do not identify a constitutional right to health care for those who cannot afford it, Congress has enacted numerous statutes, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, that establish and define specific statutory rights of individuals to receive health care services from the government. As a major component of many health care entitlement statutes, Congress has provided funding to pay for the health services provided under law. Most of these statutes have been enacted pursuant to Congress’s authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to carry out its mandate “to … provide for the … general Welfare.” The power to spend for the general welfare is one of the broadest grants of authority to Congress in the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court accords considerable deference to a legislative decision by Congress that a particular health care spending program provides for the general welfare.
Recently, Congress enacted comprehensive health care reform legislation, P.L. 111-148, which includes a requirement, effective in 2014, that individuals purchase health insurance, and which significantly expands the Medicaid program. A number of lawsuits have been filed challenging various provisions of this legislation, including the power of Congress to enact an individual mandate to purchase health insurance under the Commerce Clause or other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. These lawsuits are in various stages of litigation. Significantly, there is now a split in the circuit courts, with the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals invalidating the individual health insurance mandate, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the same provision, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing two cases for lack of standing, making it likely that one or more of these cases will eventually reach the Supreme Court. In addition, several states have passed laws, or amended their state constitutions, to attempt to “nullify” or “opt out” of the federal individual health insurance mandate. Direct conflicts between federal laws and state nullification statutes or state constitutional amendments would raise constitutional issues which are likely to be resolved in favor of federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. A number of state constitutions contain provisions relating to health and the provision of health care services. State constitutions may provide constitutional rights that are more expansive than those found under the federal Constitution since federal rights set the minimum standards for the states.
Date of Report: September 29, 2011
Number of Pages: 20
Order Number: R40846
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
